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tions where the public is directly or indirectly involved. It is quite
obvious that the courts are not anxious to settle the law in this
respect as they refrain from passing on the principle whenever
possible. As a result, the status of the doctrine in Ohio is not
clearly established. Perhaps, however, this condition of the law
is not necessarily undesirable. In some jurisdictions the doctrine
has oscillated between acceptance and rejection. An instance of
such a practice is shown by two decidedly conflicting statements
from the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. In 1868 the court ruled,
"It is elementary law, that in equity a decree is never of right but
of grace. Hence the chancellor will consider whether he would not
do a greater injury by enjoining than would result from refusing...
If in conscience the former should appear, he will refuse to enjoin." 22
Yet, only a quarter of a century later, the same court said, " . . .a
refusal of an injunction upon the ground that plaintiff cannot
suffer as great a loss from discontinuance of the nuisance as defend-
ant would from its interdiction would be as far removed from equity
as can be. There is to my mind no more offensive plea than that
by which one seeks to justify an act injurious to his neighbor on the
ground of its advantage to himself." 23 If the adoption of a definite
rule as to the principle of balancing the equities necessitates such
diametrically opposed viewpoints when only slightly different fact
patterns are being considered, perhaps the Ohio courts are prudent
in not definitely declaring the law, and thus being better able to base
their decisions on the particular facts of the case.
L. B. C.
Trusts
STATUS AND LIABILITY OF AN EXECUTOR WHO IS ALSO
A TRUSTEE.
Testator, by will, appointed his wife and one Nixon executors
of his estate, and specifically listed the acts they were authorized
to perform in that capacity. Testator also named his wife and
Nixon trustees of the residue of the estate for the benefit of the
deceased's children. The appointees qualified as executors and gave
"Richard's Appeal, 57 Pa. 105, 98 Am. Dec. 202 (1868).
2 Evans v. Readin Chemical Fertilizing Co., 160 Pa. 209, 20 At. 702 (1894).
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bond as such. Seven years later the executors qualified as trustees,
and two years thereafter filed their final account as executors. The
executors resigned as trustees, and the successor trustee brought
suit, complaining of unauthorized acts of the executors which had
excessively depleted the estate between the date of their qualification
as executors and their qualification as trustees. The executors jus-
tified their acts, contending that they acted in the dual capacities of
executors and trustees; while the successor trustees alleged that the
acts were unlawful because the fiduciaries were acting solely as
executors and not as trustees. In the Probate Court the contention
of the successor trustee was upheld.'
Where a will creates a trust, and appoints someone other than
the executor to execute the trust, there is little difficulty in separating
the duties of the two. The duties of the executor are normally tem-
porary and constitute the administration of the deceased's estate.
In the absence of statute, the executor's duties are limited to (i)
reducing to possession the personal property of the testator, (2)
paying testator's debts, (3) paying legacies, and (4) distributing
any surplus among testator's next of kin. The trustee's duties, on
the other hand, are permanent, and their nature and extent depend
on the terms of the trust. When, however, as frequently occurs,
the executor is also named testamentary trustee, perplexing prob-
lems are raised as to whether these two fiduciary functions must be
kept separate, and, if so, what is the necessary distinction.
The functions of the "combined fiduciary" may be successive,
as in the principal case, where an express trust of the residue of
the estate was created; or simultaneous, when a specific portion of
the estate is to be segregated to the trust. In the latter case the
general rule is that the devise or bequest is taken by the executor
as trustee immediately and the same never becomes assets, unless
needed in the administration of the deceased's estate.3
In the case of the successive functions, most courts agree that
as to funds first received by the fiduciary as executor, liability in
that capacity continues until some "notorious and unequivocal act"
indicates a change. 4 This view seems readily applicable to the facts
lIn Re Emswiler's Estate, 7 Ohio Sup. 199 (1941).
21 SCOTT, TRUSTS (1939) § 6; In Matter of Kohler, 231 N. Y. 353, 132 N. E. 114
(1921); Ryder v. Loyn, 85 Conn. 245, 82 At. 573 (1912).
-In Re Crawford, 21 Ohio C. C. 554, 11 Ohio C. D. 605 (1901).
4 3 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) § 583; joy v. Elton, 9 N. D. 428, 83 N. NV.
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of the Ewswiler case. The executors, unable to show any notorious
or unequivocal act of assumption of the trustee's functions prior
to the performance of the acts complained of, would obviously be
liable as executors. Whether particular acts are sufficient to achieve
the transition of the property from assets to trust res should depend
on the circumstances of the particular case.5 Something more than
mere mental decision by the executor-trustee is required.6 He should
by some unequivocal act set apart and mark the trust res.
A few states, under statutes requiring the filing of a bond -by a
trustee, have made the filing of such a bond a necessary condition
precedent to the assumption of the trustee's status, even where the
executor has performed such a notorious and unequivocal act as was
required by the general rule. Courts adopting this view proceed on
the general theory that since only a bonded trustee is authorized, the
executor is liable as such until he has furnished bond for his position'
as trustee. More specially, the bases of these courts' decisions are
either (i) that no discharge of the executor can be predicated upon
turning the sum over to an unbonded trustee, which act has been
considered a breach of duty of the executor,7 or (2) that title may
not vest in the fiduciary as trustee until bond as such has been given.,
This statutory approach was not available to the court in the
Emszoiler case since our G. C. io5o6-4,1 adequate to support this
theory, was not enacted till after the performance of the acts com-
plained of.
A third approach to the fact pattern of the principal case is
represented by determinations that a change of status takes place by
operation of law whenever a person holds funds in one capacity and is
075 (1900); Hobbs v. Cunningham, 273 Mass. 529, 174 N. E. 181 (1930); Ellyson v.
Lord, 124 Iowa 125, 99 N. W. 582 (1904); Cluff v. Day, 124 N. Y. 195, 26 N. E. 306(1091).
1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 205; 3 BOcRT TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) § 533.
"'Mere cessation of executor's functions held insufficient: In Re Higgins' Estate, 15
Mont. 474, 39 Pac. 506 (1895); Hail v. Cushing, 9 Pick. 395, 400 (Mass. 1830); Jones
v. Atchison, 150 Mass. 304, 23 N. E. 43 (1889). Court order directing a transfer to
one.elf as trustee insufficient: Bellinger v. Thompson, 26 Ore. 320, 37 Pac. 714 (1894);
Ellyson v. Lord, 124 Iowa 125, 99 N. W. 582 (1904). Judicial discharge of executor held
sufficient: Cluff v. Day, 124 N. Y. 195, 26 N. E. ICo (1891); State v. Noll, 189 S. W.
582 (Mo. 1916).
7White v. Ditson, 140 Mass. 351, 4 N. E. 606 (1885); M. I. T. v. Atty. Gen., 235
'Mass. 288, 126 N. E. 521 (1920).
8 Karel v. Pareles, 161 Wis. 598, 155 N. W. 152 (1915); 1 P,\EY, TRUSTS & TRUs-
TEES (7th Ed. 1929) § 262-3.
0 116 Ohio Laws 385 (1932).
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under a duty to turn them over to himself in another capacity."0
The adherence to such a rule has been limited, with few exceptions,1 1
to cases where no loss to the beneficiaries is threatened, on the theory
that it is inequitable to use a fiction to deprive them of that security.
The foregoing limitation would prohibit this theory's application to
the facts of the principal case, but in the decision of such formal
questions as the capacity to sue, this view has been resorted to.
Though the result of the Envwiler case appears to be satisfactory
and in accord with the majority opinion, it does conflict with what
Scott describes as the "better view," 12 supported only by the Massa-
chusetts courts. 3 The proponents of this view declare that if the
acts of the executors involved are such as the executors were au-
thorized to perform as trustees, but not as executors, the executor
would not be liable. The acts would be treated as having been done
by the executor as trustee. Although it would have been more
regular for them to have qualified as trustees, the Massachusetts
courts reason that they were the persons to whom the property in
their charge, both real and personal, was given by the will, and who
had the right as trustees to make the expenditures.' The objection
under that situation would be fully answered -by the fact that after
they became trustees, they, in that capacity, ratified their acts as
executors.
The facts of the Enswiler case do not disclose the presence of
sureties in this action, but the possibility of their appearance in
such a suit prompts reference to a concomitant problem: Will the
surety on an executor's bond be held liable for his acts as trustee?
In some states the sureties in such a situation will not be held liable,
though the acts of the executor as trustee be performed while he is
acting as executor, and before the execution of the generally required
"notorious act of transfer." 1r These courts are satisfied if the execu-
tor has in fact entered upon his duties as trustee. The great weight of
authority, however, would hold the surety responsible in such a case,
10 16 L. R. A. (N, S.) 205; Woolley v. Price, 86 Md. 176, 37 At. 644 (1897); Ander-
son v. Earle, 9 S. C. 460 (1877); State v. Hearst, 12 Mo. 365 (1849).
1u State v. Cheston, 51 Md. 352 (1879).
12 SconT, TRUSTS (1939) § 6.
13 Little v. Little, 161 Mass. 188, 36 N. E. 795 (1894); Springfield Nat'i Bank v.
Couse, 288 Mass. 262, 192 N. E. 529 (1934).
14 Springfield Nat'l Bank v. Couse, 288 Mass. 262, 192 N. E. 529 (1934).
%a Drake v. Price, 5 N. Y. 420 (1851); Hinds v. Hinds, 85 Ind. 312 (1822); In Re
Quinby, 84 N. J. Eq. 1, 92 At]. 56 (1914).
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adopting what is sometimes referred to as the Massachusetts rule. 6
The courts adopting this view would hold that the liability of the
executor's surety continues until the executor has openly and noto-
riously entered upon the performance of his duties as trustee, and
that it is not enough that his duties as executor have in fact been
completed. Ohio would probably follow the latter reasoning, as
much of our probate law is taken from the laws of Massachusetts.' 7
W.C.D.
10 White v. Ditson, 140 Mass. 351, 4 N. E. 606 (1885); Gratson v. Ruggles, 17 Me.
137 (1340); Hall v. Cushing, 9 Pick 395 (Mass. 1830); Perkins v. Moore, 16 Ala. 9
(1849).
" ROCKEL, OHIO PROBATE PRCTIz (4th Ed. 1923) 1124.

